Why it matters
Sensor-data infrastructure is supply-chain-sensitive: customers cannot accept opaque builds in a pipeline that feeds mission systems, agencies and analytics. Our roadmap is to publish a machine-readable Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) and signed build provenance for every release, so you can verify what shipped without trusting our word. Today, dependencies are pinned via lockfiles and every change is built and tested in CI; SBOM and build-provenance publishing are not yet in place.
SBOM
- Planned format: CycloneDX 1.5 by default; SPDX 2.3 on request.
- Planned scope: the deployed application and its pinned dependencies. (No published SDK exists today.)
- Planned distribution: published alongside each release and downloadable on request.
- Planned cadence: regenerate on every release and re-scan dependencies against the OSV and GHSA advisory feeds.
Build provenance
We are targeting SLSA build level 3 for the release artifact set: reproducible builds with build-platform-generated provenance. The plan is to emit in-toto attestations, sign them via Sigstore / cosign, and record them in a public transparency log. None of this is in place yet; today, builds run in CI and the canonical data products are independently cryptographically signed and verifiable.
Vulnerability handling
- Planned: dependency scanning against the OSV and GHSA advisory feeds.
- Target patch windows: critical within days when an exploit path exists, high and medium on a defined cadence - to be formalised as the program matures.
- Security advisories will be published for any incident with mitigation steps, once the demonstrator moves toward operational service.